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Abstract The phenomenon of collective action and the
origin of collective action problems have been extensively
and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while
we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting
collective action at the local level, we know far less about
how these insights travel to large-scale collective action
problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of
humanity’s most pressing challenges, including climate
change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity
loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to
overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this
paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures
the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-
scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at
supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with
and overcome larger-scale collective action problems.
More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main
characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem
and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular,
spontaneous large-scale collective action among
individual actors becomes more improbable as the
collective action problem becomes larger, thus
demanding interventions by an external authority (a third
party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we
(iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the
connection between third-party interventions and large-
scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues
for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of
collective action problems have been extensively and sys-
tematically studied in the social sciences. A collective
action problem is normally described as a situation in
which the short-term self-interest of individual actors is in
conflict with longer-term collective interests, generating a
substantial risk that the collective benefit is not produced at
all (Olson 1965). For example, the late Nobel laureate
Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 1990, 2000, 2005, 2011) showed
that local users of a common resource can overcome col-
lective action problems by setting up systems of self-gov-
ernance among resource users in, for example, a fishing
village or a farming community (Bromley 1992; Agrawal
and Gibson 1999, 2001). Yet, while we have substantial
knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at
the local level (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001), we know far
less about how these insights transfer to large-scale col-
lective action problems and their solutions, including cli-
mate change, large-scale natural resource depletion,
nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance, and pollution. In
particular, while successful large-scale collective action
has occurred both nationally, such as tax collection and
public goods provisioning in welfare states (Rothstein
2001), and internationally, in terms of successful environ-
mental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on sub-
stances that deplete the ozone layer, there has been little
systematic theorising on the prospects for large-scale col-
lective action in general.
Accordingly, rather than conduct an exhaustive litera-
ture review or an empirical investigation, we instead sug-
gest in this paper an analytical framework that captures the
theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale
collective action. This analytical framework attempts to




support any future empirical analysis into coping with and
overcoming larger-scale collective action problems. We
thereby set the stage for future research and the develop-
ment of necessary policies to reach crucial targets such as
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. By doing so, this
paper also serves important pedagogical functions: by
deriving our analytical framework, we provide a distinct
explanation as to why making actors aware of their envi-
ronmentally detrimental behaviour, such as through infor-
mation campaigns, is seldom sufficient to induce
behavioural changes. Our approach also provides an
explanation as to why even very strong pro-environmental
values, norms, and beliefs should not be expected to result
in any substantial behavioural changes among involved
actors (other than under exceptional conditions). Most of
these transformations require active assistance from one or
many external parties.
More specifically, our objectives are threefold. First,
based on the comprehensive existing literature on collec-
tive action, we define and describe the main characteristics
of a large-scale collective action problem. Second, we
explain why voluntary, and especially spontaneous, large-
scale collective action becomes more improbable as the
collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding
interventions by external authorities (‘‘third parties’’).
Third, and most importantly, we outline an analytical
framework capturing the connection between third-party
interventions and large-scale collective action.
In Section ‘‘The logic of collective action and social
dilemmas’’, we define collective action and then briefly
review the most prominent factors generating successful
collective action. We refer to these factors as collective
action facilitators. In Section ‘‘The logic of large-scale
collective action’’, we first specify the concept of large-
scale collective action and then identify the main charac-
teristics of large-scale collective action problems. There-
after, we explain how these characteristics generate
stressors that make successful large-scale collective action
less likely. We conclude that large-scale collective action
needs to be supported by various types of interventions
carried out by a third party, such as the state, a trade
association, or a social movement. The question of when
and how such third parties can be created or evolve
endogenously—and intervene with sufficient legitimacy
and effectiveness—is, in turn, an issue for future research
to explore. In Section ‘‘Discussion: the dynamics of a
large-scale collective action problems and third-party
interventions’’, we graphically illustrate our analytical
framework and discuss its implications for human coop-
eration. Section ‘‘Concluding remarks’’ concludes with a
summary of our argument, an application of the proposed
framework, and discussion of potential paths for future
research.
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Problems of collective action permeate societies on all
levels, from the very local to the global, and they cross both
political borders and generations (Ostrom 1998). A col-
lective action problem is typically described as a situation
in which actors are motivated to take a course of action that
is more beneficial than costly to them individually but is
more costly than beneficial to society. This generates a
substantial risk that collective benefits will not be pro-
duced. In the social science literature, a collective action
problem is typically understood as a social dilemma.
Building on Dawes’s seminal definition (Dawes 1980,
p. 170), a social dilemma is present when both of the fol-
lowing premises are true:
(1) The payoff for each individual actor to act in self-
interest (called defecting) is higher than the payoff for
acting in the interest of the collective (called coop-
erating), regardless of what others do.
(2) All individual actors receive a lower payoff if all
defect than if all cooperate.
Using social dilemma logic is a powerful way of
explaining the origin of environmental problems and dis-
cussing how they can be overcome. Perhaps the most
prominent example is Hardin (1968), who, inspired by the
British economist William Forster Lloyd, introduced the
idea of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’. This is when
individual users in a shared resource system, acting inde-
pendently according to their own short-term self-interest,
behave contrarily to the common good of all users by
depleting or spoiling the shared resource through their
collective action.
However, not all collective action problems, especially
larger-scale collective action, are proper social dilemmas.
Other coordination problems should be included as well,
such as (1) situations that do not necessarily affect an
individual actor, but rather affect other parties, such as
patients, children, clients, or future generations, and thus
also (2) situations where a principal, representing or cap-
taining a group of actors, must come to an agreement with
other such principals in order to eventually achieve beha-
vioural changes among these actors, ultimately causing the
problem through their individual defecting behaviour. In
addition, collective action problems also include ‘‘race-to-
the-bottom’’ situations, where even a small number of
defecting actors can start a negative feedback loop, making
cooperation less likely.
Therefore, all types of collective action problems share a
feature of proper social dilemmas: they cannot be over-
come, or managed, unless at least some actors act against
their own short-term self-interest, or against the interest of
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their principals (i.e. cooperate rather than defect). A
complete analytical framework of collective action should
cover all these types of collective action problems.
Collective action facilitators
The phenomenon of collective action has received a
tremendous amount of scholarly attention, primarily in the
form of laboratory experiments or local field studies of
self-regulating regimes. These studies of voluntary and
spontaneous collective action on a smaller scale have
resulted in findings that today are seen as core facts, con-
tradicting the zero-contribution (defection) hypothesis
dictating that all actors are rational egoists (Ostrom 2000).
For example, there is ample empirical support for assuming
that the vast majority of people are at least conditional
cooperators in collective action situations—that is, they are
willing to cooperate given certain premises, such as whe-
ther other actors are cooperating too (Fischbacher et al.
2001; Ga¨chter and Herrmann 2009).
A large number of factors, which we term collective
action facilitators, have been shown to determine the
conditions for, and affect the prospects of, cooperative
behaviour in numerous smaller-scale cases. Though not an
exhaustive review, here we note some interesting and
illuminating examples. People tend to exhibit a willingness
to accept costs in order to punish free riders (Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000a), and punishment, or the threat of punish-
ment, can also reduce the incidence of free riding and
sustain high levels of cooperation (Ga¨chter and Herrmann
2009). The level of cooperation (e.g. in public good
experiments) is in turn affected by whether the experiments
are anonymous or public (Laury et al. 1995). Furthermore,
individuals tend to increase their contributions if each
person’s contribution is publicly disclosed (Ga¨chter and
Fehr 1999). Thus, people seem to be willing to cooperate if
their reputation is at stake. In addition, levels of coopera-
tion in laboratory collective action-type games substan-
tially increase if the subjects have the possibility of
communicating with each other (Sally 1995). Cooperation
is also affected by the characteristics of the collective good
(Dietz et al. 2002). Likewise, the influence of group size on
levels of cooperation has also been repeatedly studied and
disputed (Isaac et al. 1994; Agrawal and Goyal 2001;
Carpenter 2007). On a related note, Ostrom found that the
links among trust, reciprocity, and reputation are at the core
of behavioural explanations of cooperation in collective
action dilemmas (Ostrom 1990, 1998, 2005). In situations
with high levels of initial cooperation, more individuals
tend to adopt reciprocity as a norm, and if reciprocity is
widespread, having the reputation of being trustworthy
becomes a good investment. This implies that levels of
trust in other people, norms of reciprocity, and having a
reputation for being trustworthy are more or less mutually
reinforcing. Given how difficult it is to overcome collective
action dilemmas, however, the opposite direction of
causality may be present too. That is, reciprocity can also
be detrimental to cooperation. The best example of this is
when an actor, based on past experiences, expects that
others will not cooperate and therefore chooses to not
cooperate (Fehr and Ga¨chter 1998).
The facilitators listed are often interconnected and
reinforce and facilitate each other. For example, punish-
ment can be a way to foster and maintain social norms, and
technological solutions can be a way to facilitate
communication.
THE LOGIC OF LARGE-SCALE COLLECTIVE
ACTION
Theories about collective action claim and show that
simple exchanges often can be governed—and coordina-
tion and cooperation problems overcome—by mechanisms
such as trust, reciprocity, and reputation. Thus, if two
actors are involved in repeated interactions, or if the
actions of one of the actors can easily be monitored by the
other actor, the risk of reneging decreases substantially
(Ostrom and Walker 2003). However, such bilateral
mechanisms become less efficient in large-scale coopera-
tion or coordination problems. This is because, with larger
problems, it is less likely that the actors involved will be
able to coordinate themselves. Most important, they cannot
directly monitor the performance or anticipate the actions
and outcomes of other actors. This creates a demand for a
third party with the capacity to reduce uncertainty by
providing cognitive, coordinative, normative, and infor-
mational guidance (Greif 2006).
While scale might appear to be an evident factor
obstructing cooperative behaviour, current literature on
collective action has, however, failed to adequately address
the different characteristics that generate or hamper larger-
scale collective action. Instead, most evidence on the
prospects for collective action still stems from small-N
experiments and single case studies. These types of studies
are not particularly relevant, nor are they representative of
many of the present challenges that humanity is facing,
including climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity
loss, pollution, antibiotic resistance, or the achievement of
many of the other UN Sustainable Development Goals.
What we do see, however, is a growing body of research
primarily addressing the complexity of global challenges
(see Young 2002; Steffen et al. 2006; Biermann 2007;
Scheffer 2009; Steffen et al. 2011; Biermann 2012; Galaz
et al. 2012; Steffen et al. 2015, Berkes 2017; Young 2017).
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As we see it, the scholarly community needs to recog-
nise and understand these global challenges as collective
action problems, and more specifically, as collective action
problems in the broader sense advocated in Section ‘‘The
logic of collective action and social dilemmas’’. In partic-
ular, not enough attention has been paid to the character-
istics affecting large-scale collective action and thus, by
extension, to the question of how to generate and sustain
collective action in respect to these challenges. Therefore,
we refer to Ostrom’s later work, in which she was
becoming gradually more concerned with polycentric sys-
tems and cross-system interactions, such as in her institu-
tional analysis and development framework (Ostrom
2005, 2010). To build on this work, however, we need to
more thoroughly discuss what characterises a large-scale
collective action problem.
These are important endeavours, because without
properly understanding the precise nature of each large-
scale collective action problem, and analysing it accord-
ingly, not only is it impossible to identify the fundamental
causes and mechanisms behind each problem but it is also
impossible to find successful ways and policy instruments
to overcome them.
Characteristics of large-scale collective action
problems
One way to characterise a large-scale collective action
problem is to assess the impact or magnitude of the prob-
lem at hand. For example, the loss of a local fish stock is
typically considered a smaller-scale problem than the loss
of global fish stocks, and pollution in a pond is a smaller-
scale problem than ocean pollution. Those examples also
constitute good illustrations of the difference in resource
characteristics between small(er) and large(r)-scale col-
lective action problems, where, for example, larger-scale
resources are often migratory rather than stationary, which
affects the potential for cooperation and sustainable use
(Ostrom 1990). However, to fully understand prospects for
large-scale collective action in relation to large-scale
problems, one has to identify the defining characteristics
constituting large-scale collective action problems and the
mechanisms (stressors) producing these undesirable
impacts. Before we introduce these characteristics and
stressors, it is important to state that we see no clear bor-
ders beyond which a collective action problem becomes
large scale. Instead, collective action problems are better
described on a continuum from smaller to larger scale.
Number of actors
The number of actors involved is probably the most
apparent characteristic of a large-scale problem. While
group size has been studied earlier with ambiguous effect
(Messick 1973; Isaac et al. 1994; Carpenter 2007),
increasing the number of actors on a larger scale reduces
the likelihood of collective action for at least two reasons.
First, the more actors involved, the more difficult coordi-
nation and cooperation become. Hence, the collective
usage is more likely to have a significant negative impact
on the resource or collective good in question. Second, to
facilitate coordination among a large number of actors,
representatives are often introduced. However, such rep-
resentatives may act in their own self-interest rather than
on behalf of their principals, such as their children,
patients, voters, clients, or shareholders (Adsera` et al.
2003). This is very different from, for example, a com-
munal irrigation system in which each farmer can represent
himself or herself. Hence, large-scale collective action
problems are often characterised by the presence of rep-
resentatives and consequently involve agency problems,
such as corruption and problems related to monitoring and
surveillance (Milgrom et al. 1990; Greif et al. 1994).
Spatial distance
An additional characteristic of many large-scale problems
is that they affect large geographic territories that span
multiple countries (as in the case of acid rain), multiple
continents (as in the case of overfishing), or the whole
world (as in the case of climate change or antibiotic
resistance). Sometimes this is due to massive detrimental
activities more or less evenly distributed across the globe
(e.g. greenhouse gases), resulting in the global spread of
the problem. However, sometimes even relatively few local
sources can still have a very large-scale and widespread
impact (e.g. a damaged nuclear reactor or local pollution
that is distributed via the atmosphere, the oceans, or rivers).
It is important to recognise that the geographic distribution
of a large-scale problem is always directly related to the
number of actors either affected by or causing the problem.
Temporal distance
The time lag between the causes (actions of individual
actors) and the aggregated effects strongly influences the
likelihood of the emergence of large-scale collective action
(Milfont et al. 2012; Hauser et al. 2014). Many of the
larger-scale challenges that we see today have a compar-
atively long temporal distance. One example is societies’
use of substances generating waste that typically lasts for
generations. An extreme example is nuclear waste, since
many radioactive isotopes have half-lives of tens to hun-
dreds of thousands of years. Another area where the tem-
poral distance is long is climate change, as some
greenhouse gases will have an active impact on global
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warming for several hundred years, and sea levels can
continue to rise over thousands of years.
Once again, the interaction between these characteristics
needs to be recognised. A concern about long-lasting pol-
lutants immediately opens up a discussion of multiple
generations being affected, thereby once again dramati-
cally expanding the number of actors relevant to and
dependent on the solution.
Complexity
Large-scale collective problems are also typically charac-
terised by a large degree of complexity, which can result in
a reduced understanding of the problem and an inability to
comprehend and perceive its consequences. For example,
unlike most small-scale collective problems and dilemmas,
with large-scale problems, boundaries are unclear, the
evidence is patchy, and the scientific underpinning of both
the problem and the solution is often debatable. For
example, in an inshore fishery, fishermen can personally
observe that the resource is being overused, whereas
understanding overuse of the atmosphere as a depository of
greenhouse gases, and the consequences of this overuse,
requires extensive, interdisciplinary scientific research and
knowledge.
To make matters even more complex, larger-scale col-
lective problems are typically interconnected. For example,
carbon dioxide emissions, biodiversity loss, and ocean
acidification are all large-scale dilemmas in themselves,
but they are also strongly interconnected (Steffen et al.
2018). Another illustrative example is the sea ice–albedo
relationship and its connection to climate change. When
sea ice melts, a feedback cycle occurs as open water
absorbs more sunlight than ice. This leads to further
regional warming, which leads to further loss of ice, and so
on (Deser et al. 2000; Scott and Hansen 2016). This
mechanism contributes to climate change at the planetary
level, hence becoming a global problem.
Moreover, large-scale problems can lead to the collapse
of small-scale collective agreements, such as when changes
in rainfall alter the carrying capacity of an irrigation sys-
tem, resulting in the failure of old agreements, even if all
parties comply with the terms. The level of complexity of
large-scale problems is amplified by the fact that multiple
regions are affected, sometimes very differently, and also
by the need to account for consequences that span many
years, decades, or even centuries into the future.
Finally, it should be recalled that the characteristics of
the large-scale collective action problems typically differ
depending on the nature of the problem. For example, there
are great differences in characteristics between marine
plastic pollution, where a large number of actors are
involved but both the temporal distance and the complexity
are rather low, and global climate change, which scores
high on all four characteristics. Nonetheless, they are both
very large scale.
Stressors counteracting successful collective action
The four characteristics described above are all defining
characteristics in the sense that they, either alone or in
combination, determine what constitutes a large-scale
collective action problem (or at least larger-scale on a
continuum ranging from small to very large). Why and how
do these characteristics affect actors’ collective action
behaviour? Our core argument here is that either in isola-
tion or in combination, these four defining characteristics
give rise to a number of stressors that negatively affect the
prospects of collective action. These stressors should be
understood as mechanisms explaining why larger-scale
collective action is less likely to occur. Below we derive
what we perceive to be some of the most obvious (and
dominating) stressors and give brief descriptions of their
impact on the likelihood of collective action as a solution
to large-scale problems.
Anonymity
With an increasing number of actors involved, it becomes
more likely that the actors will be anonymous to each
other. Additionally, this anonymity is reinforced as the
spatial and temporal distances increase. In the extreme case
of a problem spanning multiple generations, anonymity
between individuals in different generations, some of them
yet to come, is probably absolute. Anonymity is detri-
mental for cooperation: as the actors become more
anonymous, it becomes increasingly difficult to reduce free
riding, since actors cannot engage in face-to-face com-
munication, exchange promises, or monitor that promises
are being kept (Greif 1993; Ostrom 1998). Anonymity also
has negative impacts on collective action facilitators such
as the maintenance and communication of jointly held
social norms.
Lack of accountability
With an increasing number of actors, as well as larger
spatial and temporal distances, the possibility of observing
individual actions tends to decrease. In addition, each
individual’s relative contribution to the collective action
problem becomes smaller and harder to single out. The
result is a perception that individual actions do not carry an
impact and therefore that individuals are not fully
accountable for their actions. For example, an individual’s
personal contribution to global warming and climate
change is infinitesimal. Therefore, it is easy, and
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psychologically tempting, to whitewash the (shared)
responsibility that most individuals might have to lower
their impact on the climate system. Furthermore, the global
level lacks similar accountability mechanisms (e.g. elec-
tions) that can be present at the national level (Grant and
Keohane 2005; Duus-Otterstro¨m and Jagers 2012).
Heterogeneity
Several of the large-scale characteristics tend to generate
several forms of heterogeneity, including differences in
identities, socioeconomic status and power asymmetries,
cultures, traditions, and religions, each of which jeopar-
dises the mechanisms that generate cooperation, not least
the levels of trust and perceptions of fairness between
actors (Baland and Platteau 1996; Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson 2000; Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 2010).
Through these various types of heterogeneities, large-scale
characteristics such as the number of actors, the temporal
distance, and the spatial distance, decrease the potential for
establishing and sustaining reciprocal relationships. In the
case of temporal distance, reciprocity is even unattainable.
This is valid for both positive reciprocity (e.g. services in
return) and negative reciprocity (e.g. sanctions).
Risk and uncertainty
Large-scale characteristics accentuate uncertainty and risks
about consequences, as well as knowledge concerning
which actors give rise to these consequences (in both the
societal and ecological spheres) (Wit and Wilke 1998).
First, there may be environmental uncertainty and risk,
such as the actors’ lack of knowledge about the size of a
common resource (Messick et al. 1983; Wit and Wilke
1998). Quite often in large-scale problems, there is no or
incomplete environmental information, which may result in
an unintended pressure on the resource (Messick and
McClelland 1983). Second, there may be social uncertainty
and risk, such as a lack of knowledge about other actors’
choices and actions. Studies show that when participants
are unaware of how others in a group act, they are less
cooperative (Rapoport et al. 1992). The negative effects of
uncertainty are typically exacerbated when information is
not evenly distributed across the spatial dimension or when
there is a lack of trust in the institutions that are supposed
to provide the information. Furthermore, a lack of infor-
mation today and the promises of all-encompassing solu-
tions in the future (e.g. promises that climate change can be
overcome by geoengineering) might lead to inaction today.
Emotional detachment and cognitive limitations
Large and complex problems spanning vast territories and
multiple generations constitute a heavy burden on humans’
cognitive abilities. Theories about ‘‘Bounded rationality’’
(Kahneman 2003) implies that human problem solving is
constrained by a limited cognitive ability that results partly
from the brain’s autonomous decision not to spend too
much time and effort on every decision. When actors are
confronted with complex large-scale collective action
problems, characterised by long spatial and temporal dis-
tances, this may generate an emotional detachment that
leads to inaction. For example, psychological distance to
climate change consequences has been shown to affect the
intensity with which emotions are experienced (Van Boven
et al. 2010; McDonald et al. 2015). Emotions are generally
less intense with increased psychological distance to the
emotion-eliciting event. People may also perceive events in
different ways related to spatial and temporal distance. As
suggested by construal level theory (Trope and Liberman
2010), objects, events, and constructs can be thought of in
more or less abstract terms depending on the psychological
distance to them. The further away something is perceived
to be from one’s immediate experience, the more abstract
the construct or event will be perceived. Thus, even when
people are informed about, and become aware of, the
negative consequences of climate change, for people that
are relatively spatially and/or temporally distant, they may
not be willing to act on that information because of less
emotional intensity or a more abstract construal of the
event.
DISCUSSION: THE DYNAMICS OF A LARGE-
SCALE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTIONS
Because of the various stressors originating and previously
derived from the large-scale characteristics of the problem,
the following premise can be put forward:
The larger the scale of the collective action problem, the
less likely it is that the collective action facilitators will be
strong enough to outweigh the negative effect of the
stressors caused by the large-scale characteristics.
Hence, the theories and findings about collective action
(as summarised in Table 1) showing that simple exchanges
can often be governed, and coordination and cooperation
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problems overcome, voluntarily and by informal mecha-
nisms such as trust and reciprocity or by local-level insti-
tutional arrangements (Ostrom and Walker 2003), are
typically not applicable to many large-scale collective
action problems and situations. For example, if an
upstream polluter happens to be the most powerful actor
along a polluted transnational river, there are few benefits
for this polluter to start reducing emissions. Furthermore, it
is not very likely that the downstream actors who are
suffering from the pollution will be able to persuade or
force the upstream polluter to change its behaviour. This
collective action situation is clearly different from the
social dilemma or tragedy of the commons situation, both
often used to describe grand societal challenges such as
overfishing, antibiotic resistance, and climate change.
The premise also highlights the need for complementary
mechanisms and institutions that can generate and sustain
larger-scale collective action, as well as support actors in
overcoming the cooperation and coordination problems
that they face. Thus, given that a certain large-scale col-
lective action problem is characterised by a large number
of actors, spatial distance, temporal distance, and com-
plexity, and furthermore that these characteristics are
generating stressors that counteract collective action, a
second premise can be established:
The larger the scale of the collective action problem, the
smaller the likelihood that spontaneous collective action
will emerge and be sustained.
This second premise is very much in line with seminal
works on collective action, such as Olson (1965, p. 2),
which argues that ‘‘unless the number of individuals in a
group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some






Increasing concern for other actors’ needs and
preferences, increase the likelihood of cooperative
behaviour
Kerr (1995), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2002), and Bogaert et al. (2008)
Fairness Perception of procedural and distributional fairness
affects actors’ propensity to cooperate
Wilke (1991), Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), and Tyler (2010)
Inter-actor facilitators
Trust If an actor relies on other actors propensity to
cooperate, then cooperation increases
Levi and Stoker (2000), Uslaner (2002), Ostrom and Walker
(2003), Cook et al. (2005), Nannestad (2008), Krueger
et al. (2017), and Van Lange et al. (2017)
Reciprocity Other actors previous action affect the propensity to
cooperate
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000b), Fischbacher et al. (2001) and
Ostrom and Walker (2003)
Conditional
cooperation
If other actors cooperate, then the likelihood of
cooperation increases
Levi (1998) Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2009), and Chaudhuri
(2011)
Communication Communication facilitates coordination and
information exchange between actors
Dawes et al. (1977), Sally (1995), Dietz et al. (2002), and
Balliet (2010)
Power Veto player, power asymmetries, and other
heterogeneities affect actors’ propensity to
cooperate.
Baland and Platteau (1996), Varughese and Ostrom (2001),
Kopelman et al. (2002), Tsebelis (2002), and Poteete and
Ostrom (2004)
Punishment Sanctioning of non-cooperative behaviour increases
the likelihood of cooperation
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a), Balliet et al. (2011), and Balliet
and Van Lange (2013)
Societal facilitators
Social norms Societal (descriptive and prescriptive) norms affecting
single actors’ propensity to cooperate
Ostrom (1998), Stern et al. (1999), and Biel and Thøgersen
(2007)
Local institutions Sound institutional design supporting observability,
monitoring and sanctioning increase the likelihood
of cooperative behaviour
Baland and Platteau (1996), Varughese and Ostrom (2001),
Kopelman et al. (2002), Tsebelis (2002), and Poteete and
Ostrom (2004)
Technology Technological solutions increase the propensity for
cooperation primarily by reinforcing and supporting
other facilitators
Ostrom (2000) and Agrawal (2001)
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other special device to make individuals act in their com-
mon interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not
act to achieve their common or group interests’’.1 It is also
very much in line with Ostrom (1998, p. 1), who argues
that solving large-scale collective action problems is ‘‘the
core justification of the state’’, also backed up by the
assertion by Mansbridge (2014, p. 10) that overcoming
large-scale collective action problems is ‘‘the most signif-
icant reason for government’’. Based on this, we claim that:
The larger the scale of the collective action problem, the
more likely it is that collective action will have to be
generated through (third-party) interventions.
Hence, we argue for interventions that could break or
weaken some of the collective action stressors or reinforce
collective action facilitators, thereby leading to successful
larger-scale collective action despite the characteristics
described above. We use ‘‘third-party intervention’’ as a
generic term to describe situations in which a party that is
external to the collective action problem increases the
likelihood of collective action in a controlled and managed
way (see Ensminger 1996; Greif 2006; Mansbridge 2014).
These interventions may or may not be coercive, depending
on a number of factors, including ideology, political
institutions, history, and culture. In this endeavour, we are
particularly inspired by Ostrom’s polycentric framework
(Ostrom 2010), thereby defining such a third party as either
a formal or informal institution with the capacity (and
legitimacy) to affect either the stressors or the facilitators,
or both. Examples of such third parties include states, city
governments, regional authorities, community leaders, and
even businesses, trade associations, and in some cases
multilateral organisations. For example, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a multilateral
organisation that targets the complexity of the global cli-
mate change problem in an attempt to facilitate agreements
between countries; however, it lacks enforcement mecha-
nisms. The World Trade Organization is also a multilateral
organisation, but unlike the IPCC, it has the power to
sanction non-compliance (although the effectiveness of
sanctioning measures depends on the relative economic
power of the states concerned). Whether an international
treaty, such a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA)
can be regarded as a ‘‘third party’’ in relation to the states
that are parties to it, is a complex issue that needs to be
assessed in the light of the features and mechanisms of
each specific agreement and is beyond the scope of this
article.
Importantly, in most cases, any third-party intervention
will require a certain amount of legitimacy and accept-
ability among involved actors to be effective in generating
collective action and avoiding free-rider behaviour. In
addition, the creation or evolution of a third party is, of
course, a non-trivial issue. That is, while a third party has
the potential to generate collective action, the very creation
and maintenance of such a third party pose a collective
action problem in itself. This so-called second-order
dilemma stems from the fact that even if every actor would
benefit from a third party solving collective action prob-
lems, this benefit would potentially accrue even if every
single actor did not contribute to the existence or suste-
nance of the third party. Hence, there is an incentive to free
ride, not only in respect to the collective good itself, but
also in respect to the creation and maintenance of the third
party facilitating the creation of a collective good (Becker
and Ostrom 1995; Heckathorn 1996). Moreover, a third
party may very well be an integral part of producing a
collective action problem among individual actors. That is,
while some third parties are extremely effective in foster-
ing collective action, others display substantial shortcom-
ings in terms of willingness or capacity to produce
collective goods. For example, in many developing coun-
tries the state tends not to be perceived of as a vehicle for
collective action but rather as a resource to be appropriated
in order to fulfil short-term particularistic objectives (En-
glebert 2000). Thus, the role of the third party—and its
relationship to the actors that are to be governed—needs to
be problematised and studied further in future research.
Using a graphical illustration of our framework (Fig. 1),
we summarise how a third-party intervention of any sort
should aim at decreasing the stressors or increasing the
facilitators so that the propensity for actors to engage in
collective action is increased and sustained over time.
Phase I constitutes a situation with no collective action
and where stressors such as anonymity, uncertainty, and
heterogeneity outweigh collective action facilitators. This
creates a demand for a third party. In Phase II, third-party
interventions are introduced with the aim of weakening
stressors or supporting facilitators, or both, and potentially
1 Simultaneously, it should be noted that although Olson’s claim is
reasonably valid in most cases, one cannot fully exclude situations
where one or a few actors—out of many—may be so powerful or
influential that if these relatively few actors voluntarily decide to
change from a defective to a cooperative behaviour, this will either be
enough to overcome the collective action problem per se, due to these
actors’ total impact on a scarce resource (Hardin 2015), and/or this
shift towards a cooperative behaviour might even encourage other
involved actors to change their behaviour too. Thus, it is not
necessarily only the size of the group that matters. Also, the ratio
between benefits and costs can be important. To quote Hardin (2015)
‘‘If that ratio is very large, then a relatively small fraction of the whole
group would already stand to benefit, even if that fractional subgroup
alone paid the full cost of the group good.’’ (Hardin 2015, pp. 40–41).
This way of reasoning could for example be used to argue that much
would be won for the global collective, in terms of combating global
climate change, if only one or a few major emitters of CO2 (i.e. US
and China) would take a significant step in reducing their emissions.
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also altering the character of the large-scale collective
action problem (for example, by introducing legal and
market-based instruments such as property rights or prices)
and turning it into a free-rider problem, which is typically
more manageable. Ideally, this leads to a collective action
tipping point. Phase III constitutes a stable situation where
facilitators in combination with third-party interventions
outweigh the impact of stressors, sustaining collective
action.
In Phase I, the large-scale characteristics of the collec-
tive action problem activate a number of stressors, such as
anonymity, uncertainty, and heterogeneity, which have
negative impacts on various mechanisms that tend to
generate or facilitate collective action. Given our premise
on large-scale collective action in this situation, there likely
will not be any spontaneous collective action.
In Phase II, large-scale collective action is enabled by
the introduction of interventions. However, for successful
collective action to be generated, a collective action tipping
point needs to be reached. This refers to the point beyond
which collective action is sufficient to overcome the
problem. This could be when overfished fish stocks recover
or the CO2 levels in the atmosphere begin to stabilise.
While the overarching aim of the interventions is to
manage the large-scale collective action problem, these
interventions can function in several ways. First,
interventions can work by reducing stressors, supporting
facilitators, or both. The presence of a third party can
reduce stressors such as anonymity and uncertainty in actor
interactions, such as through monitoring and surveillance
or a reporting system. It can also promote and foster pro-
social preferences, cooperative social norms, values, and
trust among the involved actors. Finally, the lack of a
facilitator can also constitute a collective action stressor.
For example, lack of inter-personal trust (and even more so
distrust) can effectively counteract cooperation. In this
case, a trust-building intervention may strengthen this
facilitator and, thus, simultaneously weaken the stressor.
Second, interventions can be used to more directly
change actors’ behaviour, such as by altering the character
of the large-scale collective action problem. Examples of
such interventions are legal and market-based instruments,
behavioural interventions, and more direct interventions
such as incentive-based policy instruments, command and
control, and regulatory and facilitating measures such as
technological standards and subsidies. However, third-
party interventions can also focus explicitly on removing
existing bad rules or other institutional barriers to collec-
tive action, such as harmonising legislation or other insti-
tutions with conflicting instructions and goals.
Third, the two different types of interventions can work
in tandem. One such example may be a carbon or chemical
Fig. 1 Generating and sustaining large-scale collective action
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tax that is implemented to correct for a market failure (an
externality), thereby changing the characteristics of the
coordination situation. This is the direct effect of the
intervention. However, one can hypothesise that certain
facilitators could also be affected by such a carbon tax
through alignment of motivational concerns for individu-
als. For example, if an individual holds a norm not to emit
carbon, but carbon is not properly priced, budget concerns
may override the social norm as a motivational concern.
It is also important to emphasise that interventions can
originate from third parties other than the government. One
example is organisations working with eco-labelling. The
intervention (labelling) may generate collective action by
targeting one or several stressors (e.g. decreasing uncer-
tainty by increasing knowledge among resource users).
To sustain collective action (Phase III), i.e. avoid a situ-
ation collective action is reverted to non-collective action, it
is required that the facilitators together with the interven-
tions continuously outweigh the stressors. However, various
possible developments can arise whereby the strengths of
the stressors could increase, stay constant, or diminish,
which in turn will determine the actual need for sustaining or
increasing the facilitating factors or implementing new
interventions for successful collective action over time.
Alternatively, society may adapt to the interventions such
that the need for continued interventions gradually wanes.
An example of the latter case is that once the automobile
market has fully shifted from being fossil fuel-based to
being electricity-based, or at least based on renewable
energy with all necessary infrastructure put in place, it is
likely that there will not be a shift back to a market based on
fossil fuels, even if the active interventions generating and
sustaining this shift are being removed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Large-scale collective action problems are at the heart of
humanity’s most pressing challenges, including natural
resource depletion, antibiotic resistance, migration, and
climate change. The phenomenon of collective action has
been extensively and systematically studied in the social
sciences, through game-theoretical exercises, lab experi-
ments, and numerous case studies, where the typical defi-
nition of a collective action problem has been a dilemma
situation wherein the actors’ short-term self-interest is
inconsistent with longer-term collective interests, thus
generating a substantial risk that the collective benefit is
not produced at all. In this paper, we propose a wider
definition including other coordination problems that also
require collective action to be overcome. In particular,
there are major differences between small-scale and large-
scale collective action, and furthermore, every large-scale
collective action problem is more or less unique and
should, therefore, be analysed accordingly.
We have defined and described the main characteristics
of a large-scale collective action problem to show the great
variation possible among different problems. Further, we
have outlined how these characteristics generate more or
larger stressors, hampering voluntary, and especially
spontaneous, collective action, the larger the scale of the
collective action problem. Thus, for large-scale collective
action to be generated and lead to a collective action tip-
ping point, this problematic relationship among scale, core
characteristics, stressors, and cooperative behaviour
requires different forms of interventions by external (third)
parties. To show the different phases involved in achieving
long-lasting collective action, going from no cooperation,
to generating and eventually sustaining cooperation, we
presented a graphical illustration of our analytical frame-
work capturing the connection between third-party inter-
ventions and large-scale collective action.
Our framework has several pedagogical and scientific
merits. First, the identification of scale and the division of
collective action characteristics and stressors and their
relationships enhance our understanding of why there is so
little spontaneous and self-organised collective action
regarding large-scale collective action problems, even
though the scholarly community is doing its best to com-
municate and inform about the current state of the many
existing challenges. The answer is simply that in the case
of most large-scale collective action problems, there are a
large number of stressors hampering any individual actor’s
willingness to spontaneously start cooperating (regardless
of what others do).
Second, the systematic identification of stressors helps
us understand and explain why many large-scale collective
action problems are not proper social dilemmas, i.e. that all
defecting resource users would, ‘sit in the same boat’, so to
speak, constantly and equally risking the loss of their joint
resource unless they start cooperating. As we have seen, for
many large-scale collective action problems, this situation
is far from true. However, what seems to be true for all
large-scale collective action problems is that for collective
action to be successful, certain actors must act against their
own short-term self-interest, or certain agents must act
against the short-term interest of their principals.
Third, by treating all collective action problems as strict
social dilemmas (Ostrom 1998) or tragedy of the commons
problems (Hardin 1968), policy-makers and the scholarly
community risk missing the potential or underestimating
the importance of developing collective action interven-
tions and policies—that is, to paraphrase Abraham Maslow
(1966): they may tend to see all problems as nails, because
the only tool they have access to is a hammer. The
framework introduced in this paper can enrich scholars’
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policy and analytical toolbox used to map out the key
actors and stressors associated with each unique larger-
scale collective action problem. Based on that information,
scholars, and ultimately also policy-makers, can then sys-
tematically analyse and elaborate on what would be
effective third-party interventions in order to solve the
problem—i.e. designing and implementing policies and
policy instruments that effectively carry out the beha-
vioural changes necessary for the overall problem to be
overcome. The success for each such third party (i.e. to
ensure actors’ compliance with interventions) is deter-
mined by a number of factors, both related to the third
party itself (e.g. type of political system, quality of gov-
ernment) but also individual-level factors linked to the
actors who are supposed to carry out the behavioural
changes. This is, however, a topic of its own and we
welcome research that systematically addresses what
interventions and policy instruments that are most suitable,
depending on how every unique third party is constituted.
Finally, as a reader one might by now ask if there are
any good examples of successful large-scale collective
action, and if so, what the framework presented in this
paper can say about what generated that collective action?
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer can serve as a useful example since it is often
viewed as a highly successful form of international coop-
eration (Benedict 1989; Morrisette 1991; Sunstein 2007).
While at a first glance, the Montreal Protocol seems to
effectively tackle a large collective action problem that
scores high, both on number of actors involved (states,
industry and individual actors on a global scale), spatial
and temporal distance, and probably complexity as well, a
closer investigation reveals numerous factors that amelio-
rate the characteristics and stressors linked to them. Among
these are a tangible and easy to communicate problem (e.g.
elevated risk for skin cancer); strong scientific consensus
regarding its causes and solutions; availability of reason-
able substitutes for ozone-depleting CFCs; and benefits of
taking action that were calculated to outweigh costs for
most countries and even supported unilateral action by
influential states (Sunstein 2007). Although, for example,
the protocol’s prohibitions on importing and exporting
many ozone-depleting substances and products worked to
further reduce complexity (by preventing industries from
relocating to non-parties while still having access to the
markets of the parties), there is much to suggest that
important stressors were comparatively modest, making
ozone layer depletion a less challenging large-scale col-
lective action problem to begin with and thus one that was
not too challenging to address. For example, this can be
compared to climate change, the characteristics of which
give rise to very potent stressors, with consequences that
are less easy to predict, a scientific basis that is constantly
challenged and hard to explain (e.g. difference between
weather and climate and constantly evolving models that
can seem contradictory), starkly differing cost–benefit
analysis between countries and companies, and the lack of
a single solution to the problem, just to mention some
obvious differences.
The two examples illustrate what we have tried to
explain and highlight in this perspective article: that even if
states (a typical category of third parties) may manage to
come to an agreement on how to cope with a global
challenge, such as emissions of CFCs or CO2, only half the
battle is won. The next challenge is then for each third
party to design and implement policies and policy instru-
ments that effectively make their respective consumers and
producers carrying out the behavioural changes necessary
for the overall problem to be overcome (and to which each
actor only contributes a minimum). In addition, the above
examples of the Montreal Protocol and climate change
show the importance of facilitators that can reduce the
potency of collective action stressors.
Summing up, future research should apply the suggested
framework on different large-scale collective action prob-
lems in order to better understand how the unique nature of
every individual large(r)-scale collective action problem
generates unique stressors that need to be addressed and
approached for the problem to be overcome. It should also
focus on investigating which blend, sequence, and pacing
of third-party interventions would most successfully gen-
erate and sustain collective action in these different situa-
tions. In addition, future studies should involve additional
actors other than, primarily, individuals.
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